{"id":3433,"date":"2023-12-07T19:55:44","date_gmt":"2023-12-08T00:55:44","guid":{"rendered":"http:\/\/www.yvancliche.org\/?p=3433"},"modified":"2023-12-07T19:55:44","modified_gmt":"2023-12-08T00:55:44","slug":"le-piege-nord-stream","status":"publish","type":"post","link":"https:\/\/www.yvancliche.org\/?p=3433","title":{"rendered":"Le pi\u00e8ge Nord Stream"},"content":{"rendered":"\n

Site web CGAI<\/a>, 7 d\u00e9cembre 2023<\/p>\n\n\n\n

BOOK REVIEW<\/a><\/p>\n\n\n\n

\u00ab\u00a0Le pi\u00e8ge Nord Stream (The Nord Stream Trap)<\/a>\u00ab\u00a0
<\/strong>by Marion Van Renterghem
Les Ar\u00e8nes \/ September 2023<\/p>\n\n\n\n

Reviewed by Yvan Cliche<\/a><\/p>\n\n\n\n

\n\n\n\n

The sabotage of the Nord Stream 1 and Nord Stream 2 gas pipelines on September 26, 2022 surprised the international community. Since then, observers have been speculating as to who might have been behind the attacks. Russia, the United States, Ukraine and Poland have all been singled out because of the advantages that rupturing these pipelines might bring them.<\/p>\n\n\n\n

Even before the sabotage occurred, the Nord Stream project had fuelled discontent between the Americans and the Germans, and even within Europe itself.<\/p>\n\n\n\n

The first pipeline went into service in 2011 and the second, completed in 2022, has not delivered a single molecule of gas, thanks to the Russian invasion.<\/p>\n\n\n\n

French journalist Marion Van Renterghem has delved into the story behind the decision to build these two pipelines, which are more than 1,200 km long and lie beneath the Baltic Sea between Russia and Germany.<\/p>\n\n\n\n

The author\u2019s thesis is simple: Europe, and especially Germany, has gradually allowed itself to be trapped in the Machiavellian plan that Russian president Vladimir Putin implemented when he took power in 2000.<\/p>\n\n\n\n

The plan was to bypass Ukraine, the historical axis for Russian gas supplies to Europe. And then, once Ukraine was out of the picture, the plan was to invade that country, without any decisive reaction from Europe, which meanwhile had become overly reliant on its gas.<\/p>\n\n\n\n

The story begins in 2001, with a speech Putin gave in Berlin as the West and Russia stood united against the terrorist acts of 9\/11. Putin announced the end of the Cold War and the reorganization of a Russia which had faltered under former president Boris Yeltsin. Putin\u2019s speech was enthusiastically received in Germany.<\/p>\n\n\n\n

But the worm was already in the apple. Far from being a leader dedicated to getting his country\u2019s economy off the ground, Putin intended to run an expansionist state, reclaiming territories lost after the Soviet Union collapsed in 1991.<\/p>\n\n\n\n

He began in 2001 by using extreme violence to subdue the rebels fighting for Chechnya\u2019s independence.<\/p>\n\n\n\n

Putin has grown increasingly vindictive towards NATO\u2019s expansion and the democratic aspirations of former Russian-controlled territories, resulting in violent conflict with Georgia (2008); the seizure of Crimea (2014); and the invasion of Ukraine (2022).<\/p>\n\n\n\n

Despite the Russian regime\u2019s repeated use of violence, Germany continued with the Nord Stream project, with marked opposition from allies, notably the United States and Poland. What\u2019s more, Nord Stream has become increasingly central to German energy policy, given Berlin\u2019s plan to move away from both coal and nuclear power.<\/p>\n\n\n\n

The naivete of Europe\u2019s elites is key to the success of Putin\u2019s plan to use energy to increase his power. These elites wrongly believed in the purely economic nature of Nord Stream.<\/p>\n\n\n\n

Several players were also complicit, especially in Germany, including former chancellor Gerhard Schr\u00f6der (1998-2005), a major sponsor of the project and an influential member of the Nord Stream AG board of directors since his retirement from politics.<\/p>\n\n\n\n

The author laments that Europe\u2019s leaders have never sent Putin a clear message about the price he will pay for his invasions.<\/p>\n\n\n\n

The West, but above all Ukraine, has suffered the heavy consequences ever since. Van Renterghem\u2019s highly readable book reminds us of the dangers of depending on tyrants to ensure our energy security.<\/p>\n\n\n\n

TOP OF PAGE<\/a><\/p>\n\n\n\n

\n\n\n\n

\u00ab\u00a0Le pi\u00e8ge Nord Stream<\/a>\u00ab\u00a0
<\/strong>par Marion Van Renterghem
Les Ar\u00e8nes \/ September 2023<\/p>\n\n\n\n

Revu par by Yvan Cliche<\/a><\/p>\n\n\n\n

Le sabotage des gazoducs Nord Stream 1 et Nord Stream 2, le 26 septembre 2022, a pris la communaut\u00e9 internationale par surprise. Les observateurs se perdent depuis en hypoth\u00e8ses sur les auteurs pr\u00e9sum\u00e9s de ces attentats : la Russie, les \u00c9tats-Unis, l\u2019Ukraine et la Pologne, ayant chacun \u00e9t\u00e9 point\u00e9 du doigt pour les avantages que la rupture de ces gazoducs pouvait leur donner.<\/p>\n\n\n\n

M\u00eame avant le sabotage, le projet Nord Stream alimentait la grogne dans les relations entre les Am\u00e9ricains et les Allemands, voire \u00e0 l\u2019int\u00e9rieur m\u00eame de l\u2019Europe.<\/p>\n\n\n\n

C\u2019est dire le caract\u00e8re \u00e9minemment politique de ces gazoducs, le premier mis en service en 2011. Le second, achev\u00e9 en 2022, n\u2019a pas livr\u00e9 une seule mol\u00e9cule de gaz, en raison de l\u2019invasion russe.<\/p>\n\n\n\n

Avec raison donc, la journaliste fran\u00e7aise Marion Van Renterghem a compris l\u2019int\u00e9r\u00eat d\u2019enqu\u00eater sur l\u2019histoire derri\u00e8re la d\u00e9cision de r\u00e9aliser ces deux tuyaux, d\u2019une longueur de plus de 1200 km sous la mer Baltique, entre la Russie et l\u2019Allemagne.<\/p>\n\n\n\n

La th\u00e8se de l\u2019autrice est sans appel : l\u2019Europe, mais principalement l\u2019Allemagne, s\u2019est laiss\u00e9e enferm\u00e9e, petit \u00e0 petit, dans un plan machiav\u00e9lique, celui du pr\u00e9sident de la Russie, Vladimir Poutine, qu\u2019il a mis en \u0153uvre d\u00e8s sa prise du pouvoir en 2000.<\/p>\n\n\n\n

Ce plan visait \u00e0 contourner l\u2019Ukraine, axe historique pour l\u2019acheminement du gaz russe en Europe. Et, ensuite, une fois l\u2019Ukraine mis hors-jeu, envahir ce pays, sans r\u00e9action d\u00e9cisive d\u2019une Europe devenue son otage en mati\u00e8re d\u2019\u00e9nergie.<\/p>\n\n\n\n

L\u2019affaire commence en 2001, avec un discours de Poutine \u00e0 Berlin. L\u2019Occident et la Russie sont unis contre le terrorisme qui a s\u00e9vi le 11 septembre 2001 aux \u00c9tats-Unis. Poutine annonce la fin de la guerre froide et la mise en ordre d\u2019une Russie vacillante sous Eltsine. Son discours est accueilli avec enthousiasme en Allemagne.<\/p>\n\n\n\n

Mais le vers est d\u00e9j\u00e0 dans la pomme. Loin d\u2019\u00eatre un dirigeant d\u00e9di\u00e9 au d\u00e9collage \u00e9conomique de son pays, Poutine entend diriger un \u00c9tat expansionniste, soucieux de reconqu\u00e9rir des territoires perdus apr\u00e8s la chute de l\u2019Union sovi\u00e9tique en 1991.<\/p>\n\n\n\n

D\u00e9j\u00e0, en 2001, il use d\u2019une grande violence pour mater des rebelles ind\u00e9pendantistes tch\u00e9tch\u00e8nes.<\/p>\n\n\n\n

Avec le temps, il devient de plus en plus vindicatif contre l\u2019expansion de l\u2019OTAN et les vell\u00e9it\u00e9s d\u00e9mocratiques d\u2019anciens territoires sous contr\u00f4le russe : conflit violent avec la G\u00e9orgie (2008); prise de la Crim\u00e9e (2014) ; invasion de l\u2019Ukraine (2022).<\/p>\n\n\n\n

Malgr\u00e9 cet usage r\u00e9p\u00e9t\u00e9 de la violence du r\u00e9gime russe, l\u2019Allemagne poursuit avec le projet Nord Stream, en d\u00e9pit de l\u2019opposition marqu\u00e9e de certains pays alli\u00e9s, dont les \u00c9tats-Unis et la Pologne. Pire, Nord Stream devient de plus en plus centrale \u00e0 la politique \u00e9nerg\u00e9tique allemande, en raison de la volont\u00e9 de Berlin de se sortir \u00e0 la fois du charbon et du nucl\u00e9aire.<\/p>\n\n\n\n

Une des cl\u00e9s de la r\u00e9ussite de ce plan de Poutine d\u2019instrumentaliser l\u2019\u00e9nergie au service de sa puissance : la na\u00efvet\u00e9 des \u00e9lites europ\u00e9ennes, ayant cru au caract\u00e8re uniquement \u00e9conomique de Nord Stream.<\/p>\n\n\n\n

Et, aussi, la complicit\u00e9 de nombreux acteurs, surtout allemands, dont celle, d\u00e9terminante, de l\u2019ex-chancelier Gerhard Schr\u00f6der (1998-2005), grand parrain du projet et, d\u00e8s apr\u00e8s sa sortie de la vie politique, membre influent du Conseil d\u2019administration de Nord Stream AG.<\/p>\n\n\n\n

Les dirigeants de l\u2019Europe n\u2019ont jamais envoy\u00e9 \u00e0 Poutine un message clair sur le co\u00fbt qu\u2019il aurait \u00e0 subir \u00e0 la suite de ses invasions, d\u00e9plore l\u2019auteure.<\/p>\n\n\n\n

L\u2019Occident, mais au premier plan l\u2019Ukraine, en subit depuis les lourdes cons\u00e9quences, et il est heureux qu\u2019un tel livre, qui se lit d\u2019un trait, ait \u00e9t\u00e9 \u00e9crit pour rappeler les dangers de d\u00e9pendre de tyrans pour assurer sa s\u00e9curit\u00e9 \u00e9nerg\u00e9tique.<\/p>\n","protected":false},"excerpt":{"rendered":"

Site web CGAI, 7 d\u00e9cembre 2023 BOOK REVIEW \u00ab\u00a0Le pi\u00e8ge Nord Stream (The Nord Stream Trap)\u00ab\u00a0by Marion Van RenterghemLes Ar\u00e8nes \/ September 2023 Reviewed by Yvan Cliche The sabotage of the Nord Stream 1 and Nord Stream 2 gas pipelines on September 26, 2022 surprised the international community. Since then, observers have been speculating as to […]<\/p>\n","protected":false},"author":1,"featured_media":0,"comment_status":"closed","ping_status":"open","sticky":false,"template":"","format":"standard","meta":{"footnotes":""},"categories":[4],"tags":[950],"class_list":["post-3433","post","type-post","status-publish","format-standard","hentry","category-critique_de_livres","tag-nord-stream-gaz-europe"],"_links":{"self":[{"href":"https:\/\/www.yvancliche.org\/index.php?rest_route=\/wp\/v2\/posts\/3433","targetHints":{"allow":["GET"]}}],"collection":[{"href":"https:\/\/www.yvancliche.org\/index.php?rest_route=\/wp\/v2\/posts"}],"about":[{"href":"https:\/\/www.yvancliche.org\/index.php?rest_route=\/wp\/v2\/types\/post"}],"author":[{"embeddable":true,"href":"https:\/\/www.yvancliche.org\/index.php?rest_route=\/wp\/v2\/users\/1"}],"replies":[{"embeddable":true,"href":"https:\/\/www.yvancliche.org\/index.php?rest_route=%2Fwp%2Fv2%2Fcomments&post=3433"}],"version-history":[{"count":1,"href":"https:\/\/www.yvancliche.org\/index.php?rest_route=\/wp\/v2\/posts\/3433\/revisions"}],"predecessor-version":[{"id":3434,"href":"https:\/\/www.yvancliche.org\/index.php?rest_route=\/wp\/v2\/posts\/3433\/revisions\/3434"}],"wp:attachment":[{"href":"https:\/\/www.yvancliche.org\/index.php?rest_route=%2Fwp%2Fv2%2Fmedia&parent=3433"}],"wp:term":[{"taxonomy":"category","embeddable":true,"href":"https:\/\/www.yvancliche.org\/index.php?rest_route=%2Fwp%2Fv2%2Fcategories&post=3433"},{"taxonomy":"post_tag","embeddable":true,"href":"https:\/\/www.yvancliche.org\/index.php?rest_route=%2Fwp%2Fv2%2Ftags&post=3433"}],"curies":[{"name":"wp","href":"https:\/\/api.w.org\/{rel}","templated":true}]}}